The paper has a negative and a positive side. The negative side argues that neither the classical notions of narrow nor wide content are suitable for the purposes of psychological explanation. The positive side shows how to characterize an alternative notion of content (ecological content) that meets those requirements. This account is supported by (a) a way of conceptualizing computation that is constitutively dependent upon properties external to the system and (b) some empirical research in developmental psychology. My main contention is that an adequate computational explanation of the behavior involved in cognitive activities should invoke a concept of content that can capture the intimate dynamical relationship between the inner and the outer. The notion of content thus reaches out to include the set of skills, abilities and know-hows that an agent deploys in a constantly variable environment. The assumption underlying my attempt to characterize this ecological notion of content is that cognition is better understood when treated as embedded cognition and that the idea of cognitive significance ought to be cashed out in non-individualistic and pragmatic terms.
0.
Introduction.
Paramount among the (recent) historical roots of the notion of narrow content is Putnam's (in) famous Twinearth thought-experiment. Putnam (1975) describes a pair of microphysically identical twins who differ only in their absolute relational properties. In particular, some of one twin's thoughts are caused by H 2 O, while the other's (on 'Twinearth') are caused by a superficially identical liquid XYZ. But despite their neural and bodily microphysical identity one twin has thoughts that are about water and the other does not. Thus it would seem that thought content is not fully determined by (does not supervene upon 1 ) microphysical states of the brain.
Thought content looks to be individuated by reference to the subject's environmental context and not by reference to her intrinsic physical
properties. This is the main contention of the 'externalist' -one who holds that mental contents are fixed by a subject's relations to external (extra-neural, extra-bodily) states of affairs. This postion, however, can seem unsatisfactory if we also hold that thought content should play a causal role in explaining e.g. the origins of the gross bodily responses which will be shared by the microphysically identical twins. The notion of narrow content is then invoked to plug the explanatory lacuna left by the strong externalist view. The guiding idea is thus that even if Putnam is right and a dimension of the content of a thought is relational or externalist (namely, that dimension of content that matters when we want to fix the truth-conditions of the sentence used to express that thought), there must in addition be some other dimension of content that is non-relational, i.e., a dimension of content that can be fixed regardless of the relations that obtain between the thinker and the external world. It is this narrow dimension of content that matters, it seems, whenever we want to provide psychological explanations (cfr. Fodor 1987: chapter 2) 2 .
The stage is thus set for the debate between internalism and externalism.
Let us characterize internalism as the view that holds both that the content of a mental state supervenes on intrinsic physical states of the subject, and that such contents are individuated 'narrowly', i.e., without essential reference to the subject's physical and social environment. The externalist position, by contrast, denies that mental contents supervene on intrinsic physical properties of the subject. The externalist claims that contents are individuated 'widely', i.e., by reference to the subject's environmental or social context.
I agree with the externalist (See Burge 1979 Burge , 1986 Burge , 1993 Peacocke 1993 Peacocke , 1994 3 that psychological explanation (both of the folk and scientific variety)
does not require the full classical notion of narrow content. But there is surely something correct about the intuitions which drive the dissenters to a vision of narrow content. What is correct, I believe, is that we do indeed need to avail ourselves of some kind of non-relational account of what it means to have a thought with a particular content if we are to provide good scientific psychological explanations. In this paper I will try to steer a middle way. I will argue that narrow content -or, at least, the standard notion of narrow content developed by Fodor-can't fulfill the function for which it was designed, i.e., that narrow content is not, after all, an adequate theoretical tool for the purposes of scientific psychological explanation. I will then defend a different notion of content, neither narrow nor traditionally wide, that seems better to meet our psychological explanatory needs.
Along the way I will invoke two additional theoretical tools. The first is a way of conceptualizing computation that is constitutively dependent upon properties external to the system (Section 3). The second is some empirical research in developmental psychology that aims to vindicate a similar approach for understanding psychological development (KarmiloffSmith 1986 (KarmiloffSmith , 1992 Rutkowska, 1990 Rutkowska, , 1991 Rutkowska, , 1993a Rutkowska, , 1993b . I will introduce these empirical results in Section 4. With these tools in hand, I will argue (Section 5)
for a new notion of content: one that is methodologically more appropriate for the purposes of scientific psychological explanation. This is the notion that I shall dub ecological content.
The discussion thus involves both a negative and a positive claim. The negative claim (Sections 1 and 2) is that neither the classical notions of narrow nor of wide content are suitable for the purposes of psychological explanation. The positive claim (Sections 3, 4 and 5) is that there exists an alternative notion of content that meets those requirements.
1.
The Nature and Role of Narrow Content.
There are at least two features of narrow content on which everybody seems to agree. First, narrow content strongly supervenes on intrinsic, nonintentional, physical properties of an organism. It is precisely that feature which makes narrow content narrow 4 . The second relevant feature is that narrow content is invoked mainly, if not exclusively, for predicting and explaining behavior.
Given just these two features, one might well ask what makes narrow content 'content' at all. But interestingly enough this issue is usually finessed by making a general assumption: that whatever is going on in the head of a subject such that we invoke it to account for her behavior deserves to be treated as a contentful state of some kind. The image of the mind as a computer undergirds this assumption. According to a classical version of the computational view, intentional states are supported by states that involve symbols of a mental language or Language of Thought (Fodor 1975) . My belief that there is an apple pie in the fridge involves my being in some kind of computational relation to the mentalese symbols corresponding to "There is an apple pie in the fridge". The content of such an intentional state is just the content of that chain of symbols in mentalese and the fact that it is a beliefinstead of a desire or a doubt-is determined by the nature of its computational relation to the rest of my mental states and / or my behaviour.
The symbols of that mental language possess a combinatorial syntax and are physically implemented by the brain. will not be sufficient to determine even the narrow content of the thought token. Presumably, the same particular physical event or state that is a particular thought that water is the best drink for quenching thirst might, if the functional organization of the thinker were different enough, have not only a different wide content, but also a different narrow content. (Stalnaker 1990: 135) In other words, the properties that seem to account for a state's narrow content and that would justify its intentional (i.e., semantic) role for the internalist are not syntactical properties of individual thought tokens. The upshot, it seems to me, is that even if we accept that the mental states must supervene on a system's intrinsic physical description, we must still recognize that specific mental states are not constituted by syntactic properties. Instead, the individuation even of narrow contents will depend on further facts concerning the large scale functional organization of the system. Such a concession, however, immediately paves the way for an even more radical proposal: the proposal to extend the supervenience base to include not just facts about the larger scale details of the inner economy, but to include facts about what might be termed the local ecological economy. This would include both the organism itself and certain aspects (this restriction to be discussed later) of local environmental structure. This is the proposal to be pursued in Sections 3-5. First though, we should notice a few more problems with the traditional notions of both narrow and wide content.
Narrow Content, Wide Content and Scientific Psychology.
Can any kind of narrow content really fulfill the explanatory role for which it has been created? In other words, can the causal explanation of an agent's behavior consist in the specification of the role played by her internal states as specified by an internalist content-involving description? 5 By an internalist content-involving description I mean the kind of description that would be cashed out in terms of the system's intrinsic properties characterized independently of the system's interaction with its environment.
One problem is that whenever we try to formulate such descriptions, we lose the very narrowness that we were trying to capture. This is because psychological explanations invoke mental states with particular intentional contents in order to explain or justify a given course of action. The individuation of a mental state as an allegedly explanatory state with suchand-such a particular content is then achieved in part by appealing to properties of the external objects and events that are implicated in a particular behavior. But, if this is so, then those content-involving descriptions can't really be of a purely internalist kind; they can't be narrow content-involving descriptions.
At this stage, a distinction might be drawn between narrow content as explanatory of a subject's attempt to do something and narrow content as explanatory of why that attempt succeeded, if it did succeed, or failed, if it failed. The subject's external environment is indeed relevant to explaining the success or failure of any attempt to perform a given action. An internalist interested in the explanatory aspect of narrow content might claim that narrow content matters also if we want to explain the success or failure of the actions performed by the subject in its environment. Let's call this internalist's goal oriented position a Type 0 claim 6 .
It seems to me, however, that Type 0 claims need not be a threat to the kind of position I am going to defend. Legitimate as they are, Type 0 claims aim to address an issue different from the one I am concerned with in this paper. The evaluation of the appropriateness of the notion of narrow content that I am concerned with here is tied to the explanation of a system's behavior,
i.e., the explanation of why someone tried to do something. This is the central issue for psychology. The explanation of the success or failure of such attempts is obviously important from some other points of view (e.g., from an evolutionary point of view) but it is not important from a psychological perspective. In the next section, I shall mention David Papineau's concern with this problem, but for now, the following should be clear. Type 0 claims concern why a subject achieves or fails to achieve a certain goal, while the claims that are relevant for the discussion at hand concern only the actions displayed by a subject in pursuing a goal.
A sensible internalist, concerned with this second issue, would agree that to explain behavior, we must know what in the subject's external environment is being represented to that subject. But this internalist will insist that it is still the subject's inner states rather than anything outside her head which determine the behavior psychology needs to explain. In other words, the sensible internalist will still insist that the subject's internal and narrowly individuated states determine her beliefs and therefore explain her behavior. Let's call the sensible internalist's weakly environment-invoking position a Type I claim.
In reply to the sensible internalist, let me say the following. Remember that I am arguing against the explanatory adequacy of a given concept, namely, narrow content, for scientific psychology. My worry is thus that the exchange between subject and environment might at times be so complex, and the dynamics of the overall coupled system so different from the dynamics of either component alone, that it is often much more methodologically fruitful to take the dynamics of the whole (subject cum local environment) as the basic explanatory unit in psychology. Let's call this stronger position a Type II claim. The stronger Type II theorist aims to show that sometimes such a division between world and agent is not productive; that it is not always methodologically appropriate for psychological purposes. Think e.g. of swimming. It is not just that we hit the water and trigger a swimming routine.
Instead, we produce a movement, the water flow changes and that alteration calls forth a new movement, and so on. disappears from the screen and new zoids begin to fall again -from the top of the screen-at a speed that increases with successful performance of the game. While falling, the player can operate on the zoid -rotate it, move it to the left, to the right, or drop it directly to the bottom of the row. The purpose of the game is thus to match zoid-shapes and row-shapes under -severetime constraints. What Kirsh and Maglio have shown is that advanced players of Tetris, although able to mentally rotate a zoid so as to better determine its shape, often prefer to rotate the zoid physically (this is an option in the game), because this external manipulation is both faster and more reliable 9 .
Physical Zoid rotation, Kirsh & Maglio suggest, is best thought of as a proper part of a distinct computational sub-routine invoked during expert play. The fact that this sub-routine incorporates a "call to the world" is less important than the fact that it constitutes a computationally unified whole.
The density of information flow within the sub-routine (including the operations performed in the world) is so great and so temporally complex that the decomposition of the system into biological wetware and local environment structure is less revealing, from a computational point of view, than the decomposition into a set of sub-routines one of which is partly constituted by operations performed out in the real world.
What these experiments suggest is that some cognitive states may be best characterized in terms of world-involving skills or abilities rather than merely in terms of the inner brain structures underlying performance. The question is thus whether the best unit of analysis for understanding cognitive organization is always the bare biological device or whether it is sometimes the agent plus a select chunk of the local environment (See also Hutchins 1995). The kind of research just discussed suggests that sometimes, at least, the latter option is explanatorily attractive. Type II claims are thus not claims about the nature of the computational processes involved in psychological explanations. They are claims about the methodological advantages of looking at coupled systems whose overall dynamics are taken as explanatorily central. As should become clearer later in the paper, my contention is that the characterization of computational descriptions that is most fertile for the explanation of psychological phenomena is externalist in this Type II sense (cfr. Peacocke 1994).
The contention is that an adequate computational explanation of the behavior involved in many cognitive activities should invoke a concept of ecological content -one that captures the intimate dynamical relationship between the inner and the outer. If that notion of content is to play its explanatory role, then we should characterize it in such a way that it couldn't be ascribed to an agent except insofar as the agent is embodied and embedded in a particular environment. It follows that the notion of content will not be narrow in the standard individualist sense. I thus aim to defend a notion of content that is neither traditionally narrow nor traditionally wide, yet which serves the purposes of scientific psychological explanation in a way consistent with both the supervenience constraint and the insights concerning Here is why.
First, to argue the need for a semantic device like wide content is not necessarily to rule out the possibility of also invoking some notion of narrow notion. Indeed, so-called dual factor theories attempt to provide an explanation of the content of our utterances and mental states in terms that thus involve two different notions, each motivated by separate concerns. One notion -the psychologically relevant one-deals with the causal explanatory aspect of mental states and/or sentences. The other deals with contentful mental states and/or sentences as related to propositions, i.e., as objects that can be assigned referential truth-conditions (See McGinn 1982; Block 1986) . A notion of content designed to play an explanatory role in psychology thus doesn't necessarily conflict with a notion of wide content: it represents a challenge only for its individualistic counterpart 10 .
Second, the friend of wide content is concerned not only to make a
constitutive claim about what makes something a state with a particular content, but also to display the relational character of the explananda of Folk Psychology, i.e., of the kind of psychology concerned with the relationships between propositional attitudes and actions. Tyler Burge (1986) and
Christopher Peacocke (1993 Peacocke ( , 1994 have been pursuing just such an agenda (See also Hornsby 1986) . But the kind of psychological explanation that matters for the characterization of ecological content is not the folk variety. It is scientific psychological explanation that is at issue. Insofar as wide content is mainly tied up with folk psychological explanations, it need not be in competition with our alternative account.
Third, it might be suggested that the truth or falsity of a belief does matter. It matters whenever we want to explain why an agent is successful (or not) in achieving a certain end. David Papineau, for example, has argued that truth values matter whenever we are concerned to explain success and has suggested we treat truth as the guarantee of such success (Papineau 1990 ).
But even if this argument is sound, it doesn't impinge upon the explanatory character of wide content. As I said, wide content is a semantic device that we take it that psychological states are invoked to explain behavior. For if the liquid in Lake Michigan turns out to be made of XYZ instead of H 2 O, but nothing other that this microphysical composition has changed, there is no reason to suppose that the behavior of the agents in contact with that substance would change either. These microphysical differences matter for the individuation of wide contents but they don't make any computational difference to the subject and, as such, don't affect what we are calling ecological contents. To further clarify this notion, let us first make a small digression concerning the concept of computation.
Computation and Explanation.
A major rationale for the claim that the idea of narrow content is needed for the purposes of scientific psychology is the conviction that scientific psychological explanations will be computational. Computational processes, it is said (Fodor 1981 ) cannot be sensitive to external properties.
Therefore psychological explanations can only involve internal properties. argue for a notion of computational states whose individuation is sensitive to external properties in the sense that, without invoking them in our taxonomy, we couldn't specify the causal organization of the system (Peacocke 1993 (Peacocke , 1994 . That idea, however, remains a little too close to a Type I claim. The basic individualistic assumption is unaffected: it is assumed that modulo its external individuation, the content of a thought still supervenes on the inner vehicles of that thought. By contrast, I aim to argue for a genuinely (Type II) externalist account of computationalism. We may begin by rehearsing (what I take to be) the main reason why the classic individualistic view of computation has so long prevailed 11 .
A key factor underlying this persistence is the long-standing tendency to treat cognition in a completely disembodied fashion. This disembodied approach not only has failures of its own, but has also contributed to a notion of computational organization that systematically marginalizes the properties of the environment in which the system is embedded. But such a disembodied computational approach looks increasingly ill-suited to the explanation of adaptive success. This is reflected although important in certain restricted domains, the disembodied computational approach is no longer the only model in psychology. Neither is it in the philosophy of mind.
Other constructs for understanding cognition have lately been developed in different areas of Cognitive Science. Artificial Life (especially work in robotics and Autonomous Agent theory) is one of those areas (See e.g. Ackley & Littman 1992 , Beer 1990 , Brooks 1991 , Harvey et al. 1993 , Hinton & Nowland 1987 . The notion of representation employed within these models invokes a kind of content-involving computational description that is Type II externalist. In these accounts cognition is characterized basically in terms of actions, i.e., in terms of the exchanges between the physical / biological features of an organism and those of the environment in which the organism is embedded and functioning. Where content-involving computational descriptions are suitable for the explanation of such a cognizer's behavior, they involve a notion of content that is partly constituted by the abilities of the systems to interact in specific ways with the world in which they are embedded. The inner states need not constitute any kind of replica or objective model of the world, so much as to engage with those properties of the environment that the system needs to co-opt in the service of adaptive success.
It is worth noticing that I am not thus claiming that a computational description is externalist just because the inputs originate in the world. That claim would be trivial! My claim is that it can be methodologically fruitful to treat certain computational processes as emergent out of the complex dynamical properties of a wider system that actually includes chunks of the local environment. My claim is thus a Type II claim according to which psychological explanation would be better served if we appeal to a dimension of enacted content, i.e., a notion of content that supervenes on interactions between the system and its environment (cfr. Varela et al. 1991) . It is this notion of enacted content that is needed to explain why cognitive agents behave in the way they do, and to generate useful predictions of their behavior. Given that the explanation and prediction of behavior are the aims of psychology, it is not difficult to see that, once computational descriptions are understood in this externalist way, we have effectively secured their scientific role. In the next Section, I rehearse some of the empirical support for this kind of computational externalism.
Perceptual-Cognitive Development.
A variety of psychological and psychophysical experiments look to challenge the individualist philosopher's claim that "whole subjects plus embedding environments do not make up integrated, computational systems" (Segal 1991: 492) . For example, the especially crucial role of subject / environment interactions in computational theorizing about human development suggests an explanatory paradigm convivial to the Type II externalist. This research supports the idea that a notion of content fit to play an explanatory role in psychology can't always be defined independently of the properties of the environment with which the organism interacts.
An example. Tracking moving objects, defensive motions, stopping moving objects and reaching for objects of different shapes and weights are all examples of infants' interactions with their environment (Rutkowska 1990 (Rutkowska , 1991 (Rutkowska , 1993a (Rutkowska , 1993b such as a surface, over many situations does not entail any ability to represent it as a property that is common to that range of situations, let alone potentially applicable to others (Rutkowska, 1993a: 971) .
If we opt for this second, action-guided, approach, we will have to acknowledge that visually based representations are not to be conceptualized independently of behavioral processes. One reason is that these processes often change the viewer's relationship to her/his environment, and this in turn changes the information available to visual processing. As these diachronic processes of change are the outcome of our sensory-motor systems' local interactions with the environment, they invite a computational account based on the concept of action. This computational account could not be developed without including as explananda descriptions that involve properties that belong to that environment and that are therefore external to the system. But more significantly, what we really need, in order to pursue this computational strategy, is a truly interactive account of vision in which "systems ostensibly 'extrinsic' to literally seeing the world, such as the motor system and other sensory systems (auditory, somatosensory), do in fact play a significant role in what is literally seen" (P. S. Churchland et al. 1994: 23) .
Underlying this alternative account of the computational organization and dynamics of mammalian vision is the idea that the visual system is much more intimately integrated with other action systems, such as the motor, auditory and somatosensory systems than was previously suspected (but see Gibson 1979 ). This integration, however, is not a hierarchical process in which connection to the motor system takes place once the internal representation has been fully constituted. Instead:
... motor assembling begins on the basis of preliminary and minimal analysis. Some motor decisions, such as eye movements, head movements, and keeping the rest of the body motionless, are often made on the basis of minimal analysis precisely in order to achieve an upgraded and more fully elaborated visuomotor representation (P. S. Churchland et al, 1994: 27) If this hypothesis is correct -and numerous psychophysical experiments, like the ones developed by Rutkowska, seem to support its plausibility-, then we must begin to re-think our ideas about computation and representation so as to capture the essential interpenetration of sensing, thinking and acting. If computational descriptions are going to play a role here, they will be best conceptualized in terms of externalist contentinvolving descriptions, since the constitutive parameters that fix the content of those descriptions will belong to the array of relations between the system and properties of its environment. In addition, a great deal of cognition may involve tracking properties of objects in such a way that the internal representations of those objects are not representations of the objects themselves. Instead, it is only the mode of presentation of the object under a particular perspective and within a particular behavioral context that counts.
The interactive framework for understanding vision proposed by P. S.
Churchland 
Ecological Content.
One type of practical interaction (that has already received useful philosophical attention) is the kind that involves some discriminative ability on the part of the subject. Such discriminative abilities, it has been suggested, are pivotal for the project of individuating the contents of our thoughts. This claim is found in some of the writings of the later Wittgenstein and is central to Dummett's characterization of the nature of a theory of meaning (See Dummett 1975 , 1976 . Closer to the narrow / wide debate itself, Gareth
Evans ' (1982) and Cussins' (1992) (Evans 1982: 18-22) . The criterion is intuitive because, as a contentindividuation tool, it relies on abilities that exploit our being connected to the objects of our thoughts without assuming that we have any special conception of those objects, i.e. without assuming that the untutored subject can provide a description of the causal mechanisms underlying those interactive abilities. Dummett -commenting on Frege-makes a similar point when he claims that "all that is necessary, in order that the senses of two names which have the same referent should differ, is that we should have a different way of recognizing an object as the referent of each of the two names: there is no reason to suppose that the means by which we effect such a recognition should be expressible by means of a definite description or any other singular term" (Dummett, 1973: 98) . In the same vein, although this time focusing on the experiential character of our abilities to entertain different attitudes toward an object, Cussins points out that the abilities are not available to the subject as the content's referent, but they are available to the subject as the subject's experience-based knowledge of how to act on the object, and respond to it. The theorist may canonically specify the content by referring to abilities, because the cognitive significance of the content consists in the experiential accessibility of these abilities to the subject in experience-based knowing-how. (Cussins 1992: 655-656) Using one of Evans' favorite examples, we could thus say that what fixes the content of the experience of hearing a sound as coming from 'over there' is the subject's particular ability to negotiate the domain in which she is embedded (Evans 1982: 154) . To 'negotiate a domain' is to be able to cope with a variety of specific situations in a constantly variable environment. It is to have a set of skills, abilities and other know-hows that will enable us to carry out a particular task, where such skills need not include any explicit theoretical knowledge. Even if 'over there' could be substituted salva veritate by 'from the North', that doesn't imply that we can describe the subject's experience as hearing a sound coming from the North, i.e., it doesn't imply that the subject possesses e.g. the concept NORTH THERE, or any of the concepts involved in spatial directions. In other words, it doesn't entail that the subject has the concept NORTH in any way that can be assimilated to the possession of theoretical knowledge. The properties that count for the explanation of the subject's behavior are sensory properties that function in a structured way so as to support the various movements involved in the identification of the sound as coming from a particular place.
If we substitute 'content' for 'concept' in the above paragraph, we will have a pretty clear vision of the notion of ecological content. Such content is constituted by the set of skills, abilities, and know-hows that an agent deploys to negotiate a domain. The properties that constitute the state's ecological content include only those properties of the environment that make a difference to the behavior of the coupled system. But these need not be available to the subject as propositional knowledge. From a developmental and an evolutionary point of view, explicit propositional knowledge looks to come much later than such basic abilities to cope with concrete situations in a complex environment. Accordingly, our emphasis is on the agent's capacity to adapt to its immediate circumstances in the world, and not on those more objective descriptions that a theorist might introduce as representations of those circumstances 13 . The strong assumption underlying my attempt to characterize an explanatory notion of content for psychology is thus that cognition is better understood when treated as embedded cognition and therefore that the notion of content ought to be cashed out in nonindividualistic and pragmatic terms.
Given the evolutionary considerations just mentioned, it might be inferred that the notion of ecological content is tied to some kind of teleological account of cognition. A word of warning about that. It is certainly no surprise that teleological approaches to content fit rather nicely into my ecological picture. However, as Peacocke (1993: 224-225) has pointed out, it is not true that any plausible externalist theory -and I'm taking the germ of the theory sketched here to be both externalist and plausible-has to be of the teleological sort. A theory based on the notion of ecological content is clearly externalist, but is not necessarily teleological in Millikan's sense, because it doesn't have to depend on claims concerning the evolutionary proper function of mental states (cfr. Millikan 1984 Millikan , 1993 .
To clarify just where e.g. Millikan's approach and the ecological approach differ, let me make a very quick remark about 'accidental doubles'.
An accidental double is someone who (for example) crawls out of a swamp due to some kind of subatomic miracle and who happens to be molecule for molecule identical to someone else (e.g., me). Millikan's claim is that the states on a 'wind-and wave-molded' beach (Simon 1969) . The marks on the sand form a complex line. If we take the complex geometry of the line as an aspect of the ant's behavior, an analysis of that line exclusively in terms of the ant's cognition will be completely inadequate. The complexity of the line is (partially at least) due to the physical structure of the beach. The moral of the story (a Type II story) is that an explanation of this aspect of the ant's behavior would be inadequate if it abstracted from the features of the current environment in which that behavior is being displayed. What we add -as John Haugeland (1995) has pointed out -is now the idea that if we want to understand such an agent's behavior, we should treat the agent's internal states and aspects of the agent's local environment as an integrated unit. As he puts it, we would have to regard Mind as "not incidentally but intimately embodied and intimately embedded in its world" (Haugeland 1995: 36) .
Ecological content takes this larger whole as the basic unit for psychological explanations.
A nice example, provided by McClamrock, is that of speech perception or, more precisely, what is known as vowel normalization. This example is especially interesting inasmuch as it involves a constitutive claim of much the same kind as I have made regarding the ecological character of content. The example is taken from a study by Nussbaum and DeGroot (1991) (Fodor 1994) . While Fodorian representations are necessarily explicit, the representations invoked in my ecological account are not. They are individuated according to particular abilities and, as such, need not exhibit any language-like format. Instead, these abilities are constituted, in part, by the subject's actual interactions with specific features of the local environment. These abilities are keyed to actual activity in specific taskdomains. As a result, the characterizations of content that they provide are not specified by reference to the full gamut of e.g. our water-related dispositions. Instead they include only the dispositions related to e.g. water as the stuff in which I practice specific activities (such as swimming, etc.) characteristic of my normal ecological involvement with the immediate environment.
In closing, let me emphasize that I have not tried, in this brief treatment, to dispel all possible internalist worries. No doubt the sensible internalist of Section 1 could still argue for a (Type I) individualistic characterization of content that is nonetheless compatible with some recognition of these ecological dimensions. But even if an individualistic interpretation is always possible, it will not always be as fruitful -from an explanatory point of view-or as easily able to display the real world, realtime dynamics of cognition as is the ecological alternative. Let me also add that it was not my aim to provide a fully developed theory of content. My hope was only to provide some notes towards a different way of thinking about the notion of psychological explanation -a way which lays much more stress on the pragmatic, environment-involving, skill-oriented dimensions of real-world cognition. As such, my project is largely independent of (and might even be compatible with) a more philosophically motivated account of content in terms of truth-conditions -just as some account of motion might be given independently of an account of the skills underlying those motions.
Whether these two projects may ultimately be reconciled remains to be seen 15 .
Notes 1 'Supervenience' is here to be read as strongly supervening in the sense of Kim (1984) : " ... the supervenience of a family A of properties on another family B can be explained as follows: necessarily, for any property F in A, if any object x has F, then there exists a property G in B such that x has G, and necessarily anything having G has F. When properties F and G are related as specified in the definition, we may say that F is supervenient on G, and that G is a supervenience base of F" (Kim 1984: 262) .
2
The same kind of strategy had already been followed by Fodor in his classic "Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology" (Fodor 1981 ). There, however, the vindication of narrow content was tied up with the alleged syntactic nature of computation and with the characterization of psychological explanations as computational explanations.
3
Once a great supporter of narrow content, Fodor himself has also been moving lately in the direction of externalism. His claim is that we can have everything we want narrow content for (intentional psychological laws, and their corresponding computational implementations) without narrow content (Fodor 1994) .
4
Following Kim's formulation we can say that necessarily, for any property F in the family of contentful states, if any object x has F, then there exists a property G in the family of physical states such that x has G, and necessarily anything having G has F. The main problem with this characterization is how to interpret that notion of necessity. I don't intend to address that problem here though. Nothing in my argument requires a particular reading of necessity.
5
I borrow the shape of this expression from Peacocke (1993) , who introduces the notion of externalist content-involving computational description.
6
Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
7
See Wilson (1994b) for a possible development of such an account.
8
This example is from Kirsh (1995) .
9
The example concerns what they characterize as an epistemic action, i.e., an action whose primary purpose is to alter the nature of our own mental states, as opposed to pragmatic action, namely, action undertaken because we need to alter the world to achieve some physical goal.
10
I have argued elsewhere (Toribio in press) that dual factor theories of meaning are fatally flawed in at least two ways. First, their very duality constitutes a problem: the two dimensions of meaning (reference and conceptual role) cannot be treated as totally orthogonal without compromising the intuition that much of our linguistic and non linguistic behavior is based on the cognizer's interaction with the world. Second, Conceptual Role Semantics looks unable to explain a crucial feature of linguistic representation, viz., the special kind of compositionality known as concatenative compositionality. Dual factor theories, I conclude, cannot constitute an acceptable philosophical model of content.
11
Robert Wilson's recent piece on 'wide computationalism' points in the same direction. He argues that " ... the computational argument for individualism should be rejected because ... the assumption that computational processes in general are individualistic is false in light of the possibility and plausibility of wide computationalism in cognitive psychology" (Wilson 1994a: 370) . Wide computationalism (a Type II thesis) is, roughly, the view that the computational systems that are interesting for cognitive psychology extend beyond the individual and include parts of the system's environment.
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